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ABSTRACT
Black is not always black. Subtle distinctions in skin tone translate into significant differences in
outcomes. Data on more than 15,000 households interviewed during the 1860 federal census exhibit
sharp differences in wealth holdings between white, mulatto, and black households in the urban
South. We document these differences, investigate the relationships between wealth and the recorded
household characteristics, and decompose the wealth gaps into treatment and characteristic effects.
In addition to higher wealth holdings of white households as compared to free African-Americans
in general, there are distinct differences between both the characteristics of and wealth of free
mulatto and black households, whether male- or female-headed. While black-headed households'
mean predicted log wealth was only 20% of white-headed households', mulatto-headed households'
was nearly 50% that of whites'. The difference between light- and dark-complexion is highly
significant in semi-log wealth regressions. In the decomposition of this wealth differential, treatment
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Colorism and African-American Wealth: 




The  first  documented  case  of  a  white  man  being  punished  for  engaging  in  miscegenation 
occurred in Virginia in 1630, just 10 years after the arrival of the first Africans into the colony 
(Mumford 1999). Interracial sex is not new and neither are the questions of the relationship 
between identity and race. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both whites and 
blacks were uncomfortable with miscegenation and mixed-race people (Bynum 1998). Although 
the number of interracial unions in the United States is currently increasing, the desire of mixed-
race individuals to seek a racial identity separate from their constituent racial ancestries is not 
new.  For  many  of  African  descent,  black  is  not  black—both  in  terms  of  how  they  view 
themselves and how others view them. There are meaningful subtleties of shade, differences that 
have socially and politically meaningful distinctions today—just as they have in the past.
1 
  Despite the complex history of miscegenation, researchers have been complacent about 
the content of federally defined racial categories (Snipp 2003). With a few recent exceptions 
(Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2003; Darity, Mason, and Stewart Forthcoming), economists have used 
the blunt instrument of binary racial classifications to categorize individuals as either black or 
white. Researchers consider all individuals within a category to be subject to similar treatment. 
Relatively little attention, if any, is paid to the concordance between social constructions of race 
and official categorizations. What may appear to be self-evident—whether an individual is black 
                                                            
1 Modern studies of the social consequences of skin shade differences include Russell, Wilson and Hall (1992), 
Root (1996), Daniel (2002), Tizard and Phoenix (2002), Herman (2002), and Doyle (undated).   -3- 
or white—actually masks a complex reality and likely does not capture the subtleties of racial 
interactions.  If different skin tones are treated unequally, the continued practice of scholarly 
racial categorization based on anachronistic notions developed in the Jim Crow South may not 
lead to useful or relevant insights into modern phenomena. As Trina Jones (2000, p. 1499) notes, 
to understand “the nuanced ways in which discrimination operates and differentially impacts 
similarly but not identically situated people, we must examine and attempt to understand color. 
Such an understanding begins with history.” 
  Embracing  Jones’  call  for  historical  understanding,  our  paper  turns  to  history  to 
document  the  economic  consequences  of  colorism,  thereby  providing  fresh  insights  into  an 
increasingly modern concern. Using data on more than 15,000 households interviewed during the 
1860 federal census, we find sharp differences in wealth holdings between white, mulatto and 
black households in the urban South.
2   
  This  study  advances  the  literature  in  two  ways.  First,  we  consider  the  operation  and 
effects  of  colorism  closer  to  its  historical  origins.  Historians  attribute  the  origins  of  light-
complexion preferences to slaveholders. By investigating data on complexion-based differences 
in attainment of free African-Americans in the pre-Civil War South, our study provides a more 
objective  basis  for  such  beliefs  and  provides  a  baseline  against  which  to  consider  modern 
outcomes. Second, recent economic and sociological research has stressed the importance of 
household wealth, rather than income, for the determination of socioeconomic status (Conley 
1999; Shapiro 2004). Accumulations of household wealth have been shown to insulate middle- 
                                                            
2 Teo (2003) notes how the use of terms such as mulatto and colored, as well as the conception of mixed-blood, are 
terms heavily laden with racial, often racist, connotations. This is not the place to develop a new terminology. We 
will use the term mulatto in the contemporary context to describe mixed-race and, generally, light-complected 
African Americans. We recognize that some readers dislike the word, and ask for their indulgence. Some have 
suggested the terms biracial or multiracial be used instead, but we resist because the modern use of these terms is 
politically charged and does not capture the meaning of mulatto as it was used in the mid-nineteenth century. We 
will also use the terms light-complected and dark-complected to recognize the likely factor that determined the 
“mulatto” and “black” identifications and to refer to modern studies of colorism.   -4- 
and  working-class  families  from  falling  into  poverty  when  they  face  even  short-term  labor 
market disruption or other temporary crises (Oliver and Shapiro 1995). Previous studies of the 
economic consequences of modern colorism have focused on income (Goldsmith, Hamilton, and 
Darity (2004); Darity, Dietrich and Hamilton (Forthcoming)), which incompletely captures the 
consequences of differential treatment according to skin shade. With its twin focus on wealth 
holdings and complexion, this paper demonstrates that the economic consequences of colorism 
were (and likely are) far reaching. 
  Section 2 summarizes the history and modern experience with colorism in the African 
American community, including just a handful of recent economic studies. We then proceed 
through an empirical analysis in three steps.  Section 3 describes the data and takes a first look at 
the three sub-populations’ differences evident in the 1860 census manuscripts. In Section 4 we 
present several regressions in which we show that bivariate racial classification does not capture 
the  subtleties  of  race  even  after  controlling  for  a  wide  variety  of  individual  and  household 
influences.  By  separating  African-Americans  into  blacks  and  mulattoes,  we  find  meaningful 
differences in outcomes between households with a black or a mulatto head. Section 5 presents 
decompositions of the complexion wealth gap to identify how the wealth gaps are influenced by 
differences  in  wealth-generating  characteristics  between  the  groups  and  by  differences  in 
treatment between the groups not explained by the observed characteristics other than skin color. 
The  decompositions  show  that  this  treatment  effect  explains  a  substantial  fraction  of  the 
observed complexion wealth gaps among all sub-populations. Section 6 summarizes and offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Colorism and socioeconomic outcomes   -5- 
History  provides  compelling  evidence  of  a  consistent  pattern  of  preferences  shown,  by  both 
whites and blacks, toward light-complected African Americans. The economic advantages of a 
light complexion date back to slavery. Reuter (1918) and Frazier (1957), among others, argue 
that  a  complexion  advantage  appeared  early  in  the  slavery  era  when  slaveholders 
disproportionately selected light-complected blacks to work as house servants and field foremen. 
Indeed, some slaveholders contended that “no man would buy a mulatto for field work” (Johnson 
1996, p. 111), while others reported that light-complected slaves resisted field work by arguing 
that their physical constitutions could not stand up to the demands of hard labor (Kemble 1863, 
p. 193). Although few slaveholders balked at setting light-complected slaves to field work, they 
preferentially selected light-complected slaves for craft training and apprenticeship.  
  According  to  Frazier  (1957)  a  fair  complexion  improved  a  slave’s  life  chances  by 
significantly reducing his or her toil and drudgery, by improving his or her access to food and 
shelter, and by exposure to the culture, as well as the manners, dress, and linguistic conventions 
of  whites.  Light-complected,  mixed-race  slaves  were  also  more  likely  to  be  educated  and 
manumitted. Moreover, despite legal prohibitions in many states against slaveholders providing 
for slaves in their wills, masters did occasionally provide for their mixed-race offspring at their 
passing, sometimes at the expense of white offspring (Horowitz 1973).  
  In  the  antebellum  South,  free  light-complected  blacks  were  more  likely  than  dark-
complected blacks to be literate. Horton and Horton (1997, p. 154), for example, report general 
white opposition to black school attendance except for those of “very light complexion.” With 
greater access to education, mulattoes labored at more remunerative occupations than blacks. 
Neither  mulattoes  nor  blacks  labored  in  high  prestige  occupations  but,  among  African 
Americans,  mulattoes  dominated  positions  at  the  top  of  the  employment  ladder—merchants,   -6- 
shopkeepers,  and  skilled  craftsmen.  Those  with  fair  complexions  were  also  overrepresented 
among  skilled  workers  and  professionals.  Among  rural  free  African  Americans,  Bodenhorn 
(2003) finds that mulattoes were more likely than blacks to work as tenants or to own their own 
farms. 
  Gatewood (2000) shows that social preferences for light-skinned blacks persisted through 
the post-Civil War period, but the increasing severity of Jim Crow and the movement toward the 
one-drop rule
3 worked to politically and socially align light and dark blacks, groups that were 
often at odds prior to the Civil War. Nevertheless, color-based differences persisted and by 1920, 
colorism and complexion-based stratification in the African American community gained the 
attention of sociologists, notably E. B. Reuter (1918, 1928). A number of studies conducted 
through  the  1930s  and  1940s,  including  Myrdal’s  (1944)  magnum  opus,  found  support  for 
Reuter’s contention that light skin tones and perceptible traces of non-African heritage were 
associated  with  material  advantages  for  African  Americans  (Hill  2000).    A  rhetoric  of 
complexion egalitarianism, however, seemingly reigned through the Civil Rights era and into the 
1970s, which led to fewer studies of colorism during the 1960s and 1970s (Freeman et al. 1966 is 
a notable exception). Since the early 1990s, however, sociologists have become interested in 
complexion-based  differences  in  non-white  communities.  Modern  evidence  documents  the 
continuing, perhaps growing, significance of colorism. 
                                                            
3 In 1787 Virginia defined anyone with one or more black grandparents as mulatto, a definition that was reiterated in 
1792 and 1819. In 1833 the Virginia legislature conceded that the one-fourth definition created a class of people that 
were neither black nor mulatto nor white. An act defined such people with less than one-fourth black ancestry to 
petition the local court for certificates of freedom that would establish their legal “whiteness.” It was not until 1866 
that the term mulatto was eliminated from the civil code and replaced with the word colored. In 1910 the statutory 
limit was changed so that anyone with one-sixteenth black ancestry was considered colored. Finally, in 1930 the law 
was changed so that anyone with any ascertainable amount of black ancestry was colored (Wadlington 1966, pp. 
1196, 1201). Mississippi’s state constitution in 1911 classified individuals with one-fourth black ancestry as legally 
colored (Anonymous 1911). By 1948, the constitution had been amended so that individuals with one-eighth black 
ancestry were colored (Bynum 1998). Legal definitions in other southern states followed similar trajectories.   -7- 
  Using data from the National Survey of Black Americans conducted in 1980, Hughes and 
Hertel (1990), Keith and Herring (1991), and Seltzer and Smith (1991) find that dark-skinned 
blacks acquire less education, work in less prestigious occupations, and earn lower incomes than 
lighter complected blacks, even after controlling for other factors believed to be correlated with 
achievement. Using longitudinal analysis, Hill (2000) finds that biracial men enjoyed modestly 
advantaged  backgrounds  compared  to  blacks,  but  multivariate  analysis  reveals  that  family 
background  variables  account  for  only  a  small  portion  of  complexion-based  differences  in 
outcomes. Color is the decisive factor. Light-complected men are more than twice as likely as 
dark men to find high-prestige employment. Research has also documented skin-tone differences 
among  Latinos,  which  suggests  that  colorism  characterizes  a  host  of  minority  communities 
(Murguia  and  Telles  1996;  Telles  and  Murguia  1990;  Mason  2004;  Darity  and  Boza  2003). 
Gullickson’s (2003) interpretation that the significance of skin tone differentials are declining 
stands in sharp contrast to an emergent literature that finds complexion differences still loom 
large in the life experiences of mixed-race youth (Russell, Wilson and Hall (1992), Root (1996), 
Daniel (2002), Tizard and Phoenix (2002), Herman (2002), and Doyle (undated)). 
  Despite the attention that colorism has garnered among sociologists, economists have not 
accounted for intraracial differences in economic outcomes that may result from colorism. One 
recent exception that uses nationally representative samples of African Americans from 1979 and 
1992 finds that the wages of light-complected blacks exceed those of dark-complected blacks by 
about  eight  to  ten  percent  (Goldsmith,  Hamilton,  and  Darity  2004).  By  comparison,  their 
regression  decompositions  suggest  color-based  wage  differentials  (treatment  effects)  between 
whites and light-complected blacks of about five percent. Thus, colorism accounts for about 
twice the income gap between light- and dark-complected blacks as between whites and light-  -8- 
complected  blacks.  Thus,  subtle  distinctions in skin  tone  seemingly  translate  into  significant 
outcome differences, including educational attainment, occupational achievement and earnings, 
among others.  We now turn to a description of the data source that allows us to contribute to this 
emergent and important discussion.  
 
3. Data 
This study uses a large, regionally representative sample of free African Americans residing in 
the urban South, constructed from information in the original population manuscripts of the 1860 
census. In discussing the outcomes of free African Americans we are, by definition, excluding 
the experience of slaves, who represented the majority of blacks in the antebellum South and 
held little or no wealth.
4  The cities that are included in the sample are listed along with their 
relative frequencies in the lower part of Table 1’s summary statistics. Williamson (1980) notes 
that the border states of the Old South formed a sort of mulatto belt, which contained a high 
proportion of mulattoes relative to blacks. The Lower South cities of Charleston, Mobile, and 
New Orleans also had substantial populations of gens de couleur libre. The size or proportions of 
their respective mulatto and black populations did not drive the choice of cities for this study. 
Rather, cities were selected to provide a representative sample of all southern, urban free African 
Americans in 1860.  
  Every household headed by an African American (black or mulatto) from these cities was 
recorded  while  collecting  data,  along  with  an  equal  number  of  randomly  selected  white 
households. Some non-white households were later dropped because the census failed to report 
information on one or more of the variables of interest or because the values reported were 
                                                            
4 Kenzer (1997) provides a discussion of wealth accumulation among free blacks, slaves and former slaves for 
North Carolina.   -9- 
clearly erroneous. The resulting sample includes information on 15,861 households. Of these, 
5,774 households were headed by white males, 2,121 were headed by mulatto males, and 3,697 
by black males. The sample of 4,269 female-headed households includes 842 headed by whites, 
1,451 headed by mulattoes, and 1,976 headed by blacks.  
  The  1860  census  is  a  particularly  valuable  source  for  the  study  of  the  economic 
consequences of colorism because census marshals were instructed to classify individuals as 
white, black or mulatto. Specifically, marshals were directed to leave the “Color” column blank 
if the individual was white, to insert the letter “B” if the person was black without admixture, 
and to insert the letter “M” if the person was a mulatto or of mixed heritage. It is unclear whether 
marshals  inquired  into  a  person’s  racial  heritage  or  classified  him  or  her  based  on  physical 
appearance, but Gross (1998) contends that local residents, including census takers, used locally-
accepted notions of race and admixture to draw conclusions about one’s racial heritage. Most 
southerners believed the differences between blacks and mulattoes were obvious and involved 
complexion and physiology, as well as the complexion and physiology of those with whom one 
associated.
5  There is no reason to believe that a census taker’s assignations of color would have 
deviated  from  accepted  community  standards  of  racial  classification.  A  second  concern  is 
whether a person classified as a mulatto in Baltimore would have been similarly classified in 
New Orleans. Even if there were inter-city differences in classification standard, to the extent 
                                                            
5 Of tangential concern to us is the possibility (in fact, the likelihood) that the identity of one’s associates also played 
a part in the census taker’s determination of color.  This connection between an individual’s choices and his or her 
identity is important but outside the scope of this paper.  It is an active area of research (see Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 
(2003) for references), but here we seek to document the effects of colorism, with less concern for questions of its 
source and its links to individuals’ identity. 
   -10- 
that they existed at all, they do not vitiate the results presented here. What ultimately determined 
whether  an  individual  received  differential  treatment  was  whether  he  or  she  met  the  local 
physiological or heritage standards, because that individual interacted with members of the local 
community. Inclusion of city dummy variables in the regressions reported below also controls, in 
part, for local differences in the relationship between treatment and racial categorizations.   
  In addition to the valuable information on complexion, federal census takers from the 
mid-nineteenth century collected and recorded information on a number of demographic and 
economic variables.  Household structure is easily inferred from the manuscripts because the 
head of each household is listed first, identified by both given name and surname. Only first 
names are recorded for spouses and children. Members of the extended family were listed next, 
followed  by  unrelated  members  of  the  household  (typically  servants  or  apprentices),  both 
identified by given name and surname.  The ages and genders of all household members were 
recorded, along with their state or nation of birth, and whether the individuals were literate or 
had attended school in the past year. The census marshals also recorded economic data, including 
the occupations of household heads. In a few instances, marshals recorded the occupations of the 
wives  of  male-headed  households,  but  no  use  is  made  of  this  information  because  it  was 
inconsistently reported. 
Finally,  census marshals were asked to provide estimates of the dollar value of each 
household’s real and personal property. The value of household real estate was to be obtained by 
asking the householder for his or her valuation of the real property owned by the household 
ignoring any lien or encumbrance on the property. Thus, the reported figure is gross, not net, real 
estate wealth and does not include the value of rental property. Marshals were also instructed to 
obtain the householder’s valuation of all other property (personal estate), including financial   -11- 
assets,  slaves,  livestock,  jewelry,  fixtures  and  furniture.  The  instructions  recognized  that  an 
accurate valuation may not be possible, but marshals were encouraged to obtain as “near and 
prompt”  an  estimate  as  they  could.    The  Census  Bureau  anticipated  the  reluctance  of  many 
householders to divulge information about their wealth and instructed marshals to cajole and 
reassure respondents that the information was confidential and would not be used for private gain 
or any other public (i.e., tax) purposes.  
  It is clear that some marshals were better at cajoling and reassuring householders than 
others. It was not uncommon for marshals to return a blank (nonresponse) when reporting real 
and personal estate in the manuscripts. An empty cell in the real estate column is generally taken 
to represent zero wealth, reflecting that the family rented rather than owned its current habitation, 
but  historians  have  long  debated  the  meaning  of  nonresponses  for  personal  wealth,  and  the 
debate is far from resolved. Some contend that marshals left the cell blank rather than recording 
zeroes. Others contend that marshals failed to report modest or hard-to-value property holdings, 
so that nonresponses likely represent small but nonzero personal wealth. Conley and Galenson 
(1998) and Bodenhorn (2003) review the debate and the data and conclude that marshals had 
idiosyncratic, nonzero censoring points for personal wealth below which they returned a blank.  
  Just as there is no consensus concerning the interpretation of unreported personal wealth 
for  a  household,  there  is  no  consensus  among  economic  historians  concerning  a  preferred 
empirical  technique.  Conley  and  Galenson,  and  Bodenhorn,  estimate  quantile  or  median 
regressions; others estimate Tobit models. Given the common assertion that nonresponses are 
typically  indicative  of  small,  but  nonzero  personal  property  values,  we  attribute  to  each 
nonresponse one-half the minimum value recorded by any marshal in each city ward, and then 
correct  the  standard  errors  for  ward-level  clustering.  We  conducted  a  number  of  robustness   -12- 
checks (available by request): we estimated models that excluded households with unreported 
wealth;  we  excluded  wards  if  nonresponses  exceeded  10,  or  25,  or  45  percent  of  sampled 
households; we replaced the natural log of wealth as the dependent variable with the inverse 
hyperbolic sine, among other procedures. In every instance, the basic results reported below 
hold. We prefer our procedure because estimating the models using Ordinary  Least Squares 
allows us to report the full results of standard Oaxaca-Blinder regression decompositions. Thus, 
although the wealth data drawn from the 1860 U.S. census are imperfect, they are rich enough to 
generate  meaningful  comparisons  of  wealth  accumulation  among  white,  black,  and  mulatto 
households. 
  In addition to age and complexion, we employ a number of variables expected to explain 
differences in household wealth. We label household heads Migrants if they migrated across 
state lines.
6 We also label as Immigrants any head of household born outside the United States. 
Migrants  and immigrants are often thought to be self-selected, highly  motivated individuals, 
suggesting that, all else equal, movers will accumulate more wealth than nonmovers (Borjas 
1994). On the other hand, movers may have financed their migration by consuming previously 
accumulated wealth, which may imply lower current wealth. There is no reason to expect, a 
priori, one effect to dominate. Summary statistics reported in Table 1 show that while a little 
over 10 percent of all male heads of households migrated across state lines, another 25 percent 
immigrated from outside the United States. Women were as likely as their male counterparts to 
have migrated across state lines, but a much smaller proportion of female heads of household 
were immigrants. Given the restrictions on black in-migration in most southern states, it is not 
surprising that blacks and mulattoes were less likely than whites to migrate across state lines 
                                                            
6 Given the proximity of Baltimore and Washington, D.C., individuals who moved from Washington to Baltimore 
were not considered interstate migrants.   -13- 
(Guild, 1969). Despite such restrictions, about 7 percent of African-American male household 
heads and nearly 9 percent of African-American female heads had migrated across state lines. 
Further, 1.5 percent of African-American male heads of households had emigrated from foreign, 
mostly  Caribbean,  countries,  as  had  2.7  percent  of  African-American  female  heads  of 
households.   
  Another set of variables is included to control for the household’s human capital. We 
include a dummy variable equal to one if the head of the household was literate, a variable equal 
to the number of literate males 20 years of age or older (including the head of the household), 
and a variable equal to the number of literate females 20 years of age or older in the household. 
Table 1 shows that about 82 percent of male heads of household and 74 percent of female heads 
were literate. Both male- and female-headed households on average had more than one literate 
female (1.109 and 1.280, respectively), but female-headed households generally had far less than 
one literate adult male while the mean male-headed household had more than one.  Given the 
absence of publicly funded education for African Americans in the antebellum South, it is not 
surprising that African American households had fewer literate adults than white households. 
Indeed, the level of literacy among African Americans is notable given the outright animosity 
among many whites toward the education of blacks and mulattoes (Woodson 1919). 
  Two additional variables are constructed to capture possible education or training effects. 
The  first  (SEI)  is  a  Duncan-style  socioeconomic  index  (Reiss  1961),  intended  to  indicate 
occupational  prestige.    It  is  based  on  wages  and  educational  levels  associated  with  several 
hundred occupations in the 1950s. For occupations recorded in the 1860 census with the same 
title (e.g., barber, blacksmith, carpenter, bricklayer, etc.) the occupational prestige index value 
was taken directly from the 1950s index.  For some occupations recorded in the 1860 census,   -14- 
assigning  a  corresponding  Duncan  occupational  prestige  score  required  some  ingenuity. 
Duncan‘s index has no entry for carriage drivers (ignoring only those few still found in Central 
Park and other tourist locations), but fortunately Duncan did list a prestige score for the modern 
counterpart  of  the  carriage  driver,  namely  the  taxi  driver.  Similarly,  modern  bus  drivers  are 
roughly the equivalent of stagecoach drivers. Because Duncan’s classification includes several 
hundred occupations—from bootblacks (SEI = 8) and charwoman (SEI = 10) to lawyers (93) and 
dentists (96)—and nearly every major industrial category, it is possible to assign a reasonable 
occupational  prestige  value  to  every  occupation  listed  in  the  1860  census.
7  When a  specific 
occupation  listed  in  the  1860  census  had  no  reasonable  corresponding  Duncan  value,  that 
occupation  was  given  Duncan’s  general  prestige  score  for  job  class  (foreman,  operative,  or 
laborer) and industry (textiles, metals, machinery, services, etc.).  Finally, just as marshals failed 
to report wealth holdings for some households, they also failed to report occupations for every 
household head. These observations are also not deleted from the sample.  We attribute to each 
of these households the average occupational prestige value by the gender of the household head 
(15 for males, 14 for females), and we include a dummy variable to indicate these observations. 
The dummy variable should capture any fundamental differences between reporting and non-
reporting households, but we can see from Table 1 that there may be much less concern for this 
issue  in  the  men  (6%  of  the  male  sample)  than  females  (46%  of  the  female  sample,  with 
representation decreasing significantly from white to mulatto to black women). 
It is likely that the labor supply decisions of women and men could be very different, as 
they often can be today, and as a result the determinants of wealth accumulation may have been 
quite different across gender as well.  This leads us, as is the usual practice, to present separate 
results for male- and female-headed households. Historians and labor economists have noted 
                                                            
7 A detailed appendix of occupational classifications is available from the authors on request.   -15- 
differential  economic  and  occupational  opportunities  for  women,  and  have  discussed  the 
negative consequences of single parenthood (Moehling 2004).  We also report our full model 
regressions  both  with  and  without  the  occupational  variables  because  occupations  may  be 
endogenous:  to  the  extent  that  family  wealth  persists  across  generations,  greater  wealth  in 
previous generations may imply both greater wealth and a more prestigious occupation for the 
current  head  of  household.  Because  we  cannot  account  for  intergenerational  transfers  and 
because  we  lack  any  reasonable  instruments  to  perform  two-stage  least  squares,  we  ask  the 
reader to interpret those regressions including the occupational variables with care. 
  Before moving on to the regressions, we call attention to the substantial differences in 
means across same-gender subpopulations (comparing among white, mulatto, and black as well 
as comparing white to African-Americans as a whole). Nearly all these differences were highly 
statistically significant (see the comments below Table 1 for exceptions). Note especially the 
significant  differences  in  characteristics  between  blacks  and  mulattoes.    In  every  category 
mulatto-headed households were better endowed than their black counterparts, but mulattoes 
were still not as well endowed as heads of white households. 
 
4. The determinants of household wealth 
Our  empirical  strategy  in  this  section  is  to  estimate  household-level  wealth  regressions  that 
include several explanatory economic and demographic characteristics as well as the complexion 
of the household head, Black and Mulatto (omitting White).  The parameter vectors b and g in 
the equation  
(1)  ln(w j) = b0 + b1X j + b2Yj + b3Z j + g1Black j + g2Mulattoj +e j   -16- 
are  estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares  regression.  The  dependent  variable  ln(w j)is  the 
natural logarithm of the j
th household’s wealth (following the usual semi-log regression form due 
to  the  skewed  nature  of  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  levels),  Xj  is  a  vector  of  individual 
characteristics of the household head (age and its square, immigrant and interstate migrant status, 
literacy, and occupational prestige score), Yj is a vector of household characteristics (the number 
of literate males, the number of literate females, and the size of the household), and Zj is a vector 
of city dummy variables (excluding Baltimore) to capture any systematic regional differences in 
the  ability  of  households  to  accumulate  wealth.  e j  is  the  error  term  associated  with  the  j
th 
household.  We also estimated the equation 
(2)  ln(w j) = b0 + b1X j + b2Yj + b3Z j + gAfAmj +e j , 
where both subpopulations with African-American heritage are grouped into the same category, 
AfAm.  We only present the value of this shift variable’s coefficient in our results because the 
other parameters did not differ substantively from those estimated using (1).   
  Table  2  reports  the  regressions.  Probability  weights  are  applied  to  account  for  the 
sampling method described in the Section 3.
8  The columns labeled (3) and (4) are our preferred 
specifications because they offer the largest number of exogenous controls. A mentioned above, 
we include regression (4) to account for occupational differences but recognize that occupations 
may  be  endogenous  to  wealth.    Before  turning  to  the  issue  of  colorism,  we  summarize  and 
interpret the other individual and household-level correlates and the overall performance of the 
regressions. 
                                                            
8 These weights take into account the undersampling of white-headed households.  We took the assertion that the 
census included all free households at face value and used the probability weights to adjust for the relative 
probability of sampling from each household subpopulation.   -17- 
Household wealth for both male- and female-headed households increased with age at a 
decreasing rate. The maximum for men occurs at about 65 years, an age which little more than 
five percent of our sample exceeded, although a handful of ages in the 100’s were recorded for 
both genders. 
Households headed by male immigrants had about half (e
-0.56 = 0.57) of the wealth of 
households headed by native-born men, indicating that the benefits of initiative were outweighed 
by the costs of moving (at least for the current generation), although the results in column (4) 
indicate  that  immigrants’  advantage  may  be  explained  by  their  occupations.  The  results  in 
columns (1)-(3) are consistent with the economic studies of immigration that show that first-
generation immigrants are slow to assimilate often because immigrants tend to congregate in 
ethnic  enclaves  (Borjas  1994;  Borjas  2000).  We  have  no  evidence  on  the  ethnic  or  racial 
compositions  of  the  neighborhoods  in  which  southern  urban  African  Americans  resided,  but 
relying  on  crude  data  at  the  level  of  census  wards  Curry  (1981)  found  that  blacks  were 
considerably less likely to be crowded into proto-ghettoes in southern than in northern cities in 
the antebellum era. It may also be the case that these free blacks’ forebears had not passed 
significant  wealth  on  to  them.  Female-headed  household  wealth  did  not  have  a  significant 
relationship with immigrant status.  Unlike international immigration, internal migration has no 
statistically or economically meaningful effect on household wealth once the city controls are 
added. 
  Household size was significantly related to household wealth.  The addition of one person 
to a male-headed household was associated with more than a 10 percent increase in male-headed 
household wealth, while the increase was somewhat smaller in a female-headed household. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that larger extended households, which were relatively   -18- 
common  in  1860,  brought  together  larger  agglomerations  of  wealth  than  smaller  nuclear 
households.  
  Literacy,  as  expected,  had  an  economically  meaningful  association  with  household 
wealth. Households in which the male head was literate had more than double (e
0.83 = 2.3) the 
wealth of households with an illiterate male head (about 50% more if we control for occupational 
status).  There was little relationship between wealth and female heads’ literacy. Interestingly, 
the  addition  of  a  literate  female  was  associated  with  an  increase  in  male-headed  household 
wealth of about 20 percent, and an increase in female-headed household wealth by about 25 
percent, but the addition of a literate adult male did not add significantly to household wealth. 
We do not have an explanation for this phenomenon. 
  Turning now to the issue of colorism, we consider the estimated coefficients on the Black 
and  Mulatto  variables,  as  well  as  that  on  the  AfAm  variable  in  the  incompletely  reported 
companion regressions.  (See the first row of coefficients in Table 2 for the latter, and the second 
and  third  rows  for  the  former  pair  of  variables.)  It  is  immediately  apparent  that  standard 
specifications of a single race identifier do not fully capture the subtleties of race and racial 
wealth  differences.  Simply  comparing  the  means  of  the  white,  mulatto,  and  black  sub-
populations implies that a household headed by an African-American male had just 30 to 50 
percent (e
-1.26 to e
-0.76)—or less—of the wealth of the average household headed by a white male. 
But when we separate African-American households into those with mulatto and black heads of 
household, there are significant and meaningful differences between them. Households headed 
by a black male had on average less than 40 percent (e
-0.95)—probably less than 25 percent (e
-
1.46)—of the wealth of households headed by white males, while the mean household with male 
mulatto head had at least 40 percent – and perhaps as much as 63 percent (e
-0.46) -- of white male   -19- 
wealth.    Even  more  distinct  bounds  can  be  placed  on  female-headed  households’  wealth 
differentials by racial ancestry. The fact that the separate male and female regressions generate 
such similar results increases our confidence that we are identifying a real phenomenon.   Further 
evidence is provided in the following section by estimates of separate wealth equations for each 
subpopulation where we decompose the differences into characteristics and treatment effects.  
  We recognize that, if colorism was as powerful a social force as we contend, ancestry and 
skin  shade  may  have  influenced  wealth  accumulation  because  lighter-complected  individuals 
received  preferential  treatment  at  younger  ages  that  created  occupational  opportunities  not 
available  to  those  with  darker  complexions.  Dark  individuals  may  have  been  discriminated 
against  through  the  apprenticeship  system  or  through  other  types  of  occupational  training. 
Columns (4) in Table 2 address this concern by including the Occupational Prestige (SEI) and 
No Occupation variables. As we recognize above, the coefficients on the colorism variables are 
smaller than in columns (3), but the colorism effect does not disappear. It remains a powerful 
force even after controlling for occupation.  In every specification, we reject the null hypothesis 
of Black and Mulatto coefficient equality at confidence level p￿0.001. 
The shortcoming of the analysis in Table 2 is that it imposes equality restrictions on the 
non-race (non-colorism) coefficients across the subpopulations.  Thus the analysis above ignores 
the  possibility  that,  in  controlling  for  the  household’s  characteristics,  we  have  missed  the 
differing return to characteristics across subpopulations.  In the next section, we report the results 
of standard Oaxaca-Blinder regression decompositions to investigate the extent to which the 
colorism  effect  was  attributable  to  differences  in  characteristics  across  groups  versus  arising 
from the treatment afforded those of different complexions.   -20- 
  Before  moving  on  to  the  decompositions,  we  should  also  note  that  the  regressions’ 
adjusted-R
2 values indicate that there is much variation in household wealth remaining to be 
explained.  Because the decomposition techniques we use below rely on an analysis of residuals, 
the results must still be considered only imperfect insights into the treatment effects that follow 
from colorism. 
 
5.  Did  light-complected  households  receive  preferential  treatment?  Evidence  from 
regression decompositions 
Wealth differences between any two groups may be due to differences in the average features of 
that group’s members (characteristic effects), or to systematic differences in how each group is 
rewarded for those features by the marketplace (treatment effects). The premise of this article is 
that  colorism  influences  economic  outcomes,  generating  greater  household  wealth  in  light-
complected  households  for  a  given  set  of  observable  characteristics.    In  order  to  better 
understand the contributions of these two effects of colorism, we use the following methodology. 
For each gender, separate coefficients are estimated for the white, mulatto, and black 
subpopulations. Because there are some concerns that the occupational prestige variable may be 
endogenous,  regressions  and  decompositions  are  reported  with  and  without  the  occupational 
variables, as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.  We omit the regression results themselves to 
conserve space and because they do not meaningfully differ from those in Table 2.  We then use 
these regressions to further investigate the differences between subpopulations’ wealth using the 
decomposition method of Oaxaca (1973) and  Blinder  (1973), in  addition to Cotton’s (1988) 
modified form.     -21- 
  The goal of the decomposition is to consider the counterfactual implied by the assertion 
that different groups have different wealth levels, due perhaps to colorism: what wealth would 
the members of each group expect to have in the absence of their identification as a member of 
their group? Although we will construct a decomposition for all four pairs of sub-populations, 
consider for concreteness the pair of subpopulations whose wealth differences may illustrate 
colorism:  mulattoes  and  blacks.  Label  the  associated  pair  of  regressions 
lnwMulatto =aMulatto + XMulattobMulatto +e  and  lnwBlack =aBlack + XBlackbBlack +e.    To  decompose  the 
advantages accrued by those with lighter skin, we consider the difference in predicted log wealth 
evaluated  at  the  explanatory  variables’  means  (indicated  by  “  ”  notation)  and  parameter 
estimates (indicated by “ˆ    ” notation) 
(3)  lnwMulatto -lnwBlack = ˆ  a  Mulatto - ˆ  a  Black + X  Black( ˆ  b  Mulatto - ˆ  b  Black) [ ]+ (X  Mulatto - X  Black) ˆ  b  Mulatto [ ]  , 
where the first bracketed term is the unexplained, or treatment, effect and is presumed to be due, 
at least in part, to colorism.  The second term is the characteristic effect, the effect on mean log 
wealth due to differences between the two groups. With the structure of (3) we are taking the 
perspective  that  in  the  absence  of  colorism  the  advantaged  group’s  wealth  structure  would 
prevail.  The opposite assumption is to presume that all groups would receive the disadvantaged 
group’s wealth structure in the absence of colorism, or 
(4)  lnwMulatto -lnwBlack = ˆ  a  Mulatto - ˆ  a  Black + X  Mulatto( ˆ  b  Mulatto - ˆ  b  Black) [ ]+ (X  Mulatto - X  Black) ˆ  b  Black [ ]  . 
These two decompositions provide a range within which we expect the actual effect of colorism 
to lie.  Many alternative decompositions have been proposed to predict a particular value inside 
this range.  Because we feel, along with other authors, that the counterfactual wealth is likely to 
lie closer to the larger group’s prevailing wealth, we calculate Cotton’s (1988) decomposition as 
well.  That is,   -22- 
(5) 
lnwMulatto -lnwBlack
=   ˆ  a  Mulatto -a*+X  Mulatto(ˆ  b  Mulatto -b*) [ ]+ a*- ˆ  a  Black + X  Black(b *- ˆ  b  Black) [ ]
     +   (X  Mulatto - X  Black)b * [ ]
 
 
The vector of parameters a*,b * ( ) generalizes the previous two cases:  a*,b* ( )= aLight,bLight ( ) in 
(3), while  a*,b * ( )= aDark,bDark ( ) in (4).  The parameter vector that we actually use for  a*,b * ( ) 
is a weighted sum of the previous parameters, where the weights are the relative frequencies of 
the two populations
9.  This decomposition has the added feature that it apportions the treatment 
effect into components that indicate the gain of the advantaged subpopulation and the loss of the 
disadvantaged population (respectively the first and second bracketed terms above), but we do 
not report these separately because our focus is instead on the total treatment effect, the addition 
of those first two bracketed terms.  It is also worth noting that, because the weights are the 
subpopulations’ relative frequencies, when comparing the treatment of people of color (blacks, 
mulattoes,  or  African-Americans  as  a  whole)  to  the  white  subpopulation  this  decomposition 
weights the advantaged population (the majority whites) more heavily, but when considering the 
existence of colorism it is the disadvantaged population (the majority blacks) that receives the 
higher weight.  
  The two panels of Table 3 first provide estimates of the subpopulation pairs’ relative 
predicted  wealth  and  the  resulting  raw  wealth  differentials,  as  well  as  the  subpopulations’ 
predicted geometric mean wealth (the exponential of the arithmetic log mean).  Note that our 
discussion  of  the  raw  wealth  ratios  compared  across  subgroups  from  the  previous  section’s 
results with pooled regression is similar to the results presented here from separate regressions.  
Households headed by black men hold on average 13% of white wealth, while mulatto-headed 
                                                            
9  Due to our sampling method, the relative frequencies are actually calculated as the sum of each subpopulation’s 
probability weights.   -23- 
households’ average wealth is 35% of white-headed households.  The results for female-headed 
households are quite similar to those for male-headed households. 
Next in Table 3’s two panels, the raw differential is decomposed into two parts using the 
method  described  above  and  estimation  of  the  model  from  either  column  3  (no  occupation 
variables)  or  column  4  (with  occupation  variables)  of  Table  2.  The  raw  differential  is 
decomposed into both the treatment and characteristic effects, but to save space Table 3 presents 
only the treatment effect.  This effect is the (imperfect) estimate of discrimination or colorism.  
As  well,  the  characteristic  effect  (to  which  we  return  later  in  the  table)  need  not  be  listed 
explicitly because it is simply the remainder of the raw differential. Our discussion focuses on 
the third set of treatment effect estimates, those typeset in boldface and listing the characteristic 
effect as  C =b*(X H
-
- XL), using Cotton’s (1988) decomposition.  For example, on the right 
side of Table 3 where the results of pairing the white and African-American subpopulations are 
presented, we see that for male-headed households the treatment effect is estimated at 69% of the 
raw differential with model (3) and 42% with model (4).  Thus the characteristic effect is 31% 
and 58%, respectively, for the two models’ application to this pair of subpopulations.  These 
percentages are the focus of this portion of the table: how much of the raw wealth differential is 
explained by treatment effects? 
For the moment, compare the boldface treatment effects to those presented in the rows 
above them for each gender.  We see—as should have been expected—that Cotton’s estimate is 
always between those of the traditional Oaxaca and Blinder decompositions.  Its counterfactual 
assumption is a weighting of the two groups’ returns to characteristics, while the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions take two possible extreme counterfactual assumptions: that either the advantaged   -24- 
or the disadvantaged group’s returns to characteristics would obtain in the absence of differential 
treatment across groups. 
Our first evidence of colorism in Table 3 is simply to note the large estimate of the 
treatment effect in the first column’s decomposition of the Mulatto and Black subpopulation pair 
of regressions.  This treatment effect is about 40 percent of the raw wealth differential, with little 
difference dependent on including occupational status.  Considering all sub-population pairs, the 
differences between models 3 and 4 illustrate another result we should expect: controlling for 
occupation dampens the treatment effect; more of the raw wealth differential can be explained by 
including this characteristic of the household head to in the regressions.  Duncan’s SEI is one 
way in which all subpopulations are different from each other, it has a positive relationship with 
wealth, and the more advantaged subpopulations have higher SEI. 
On the other hand the larger white-mulatto treatment effect (85%) as compared to the 
white-black  treatment  effect  (66%),  without  controlling  for  occupation  (model  3),  can  be 
explained by mulattoes’ characteristics having greater similarity to whites’ characteristics than 
blacks’ characteristics have to whites’ characteristics.  Even with a higher return to mulattoes’ 
characteristics as compared to blacks’, more of the raw wealth differential is left unexplained by 
any  difference  in  mulattoes’  characteristics  as  compared  to  whites  precisely  because  their 
characteristics are less different.  The resulting smaller characteristics effect leads to a larger 
treatment effect.  Once occupation is included (model 4), the difference in treatment effects is 
small  (41%  and  43%,  for  males).    The  treatment  effect  for  the  mulatto-black  pair  of 
subpopulations shows little change whether we include occupation or not (38% versus 42%). 
The final portion of each of Table 3’s panels then uses the boldface estimate of the 
treatment  effect  (Cotton’s  method)  to  estimate  two  more  comparisons  of  the  results  for  the   -25- 
subpopulation pairs.  First is the estimated return to characteristics, the wealth ratio.  It is the 
ratio of the advantaged group’s wealth to the disadvantaged group’s wealth.  The values are all 
greater than 1, reflecting the inherent advantage in characteristics that the lighter-skinned group 
has, regardless of differential treatment.  Loury (1998) focuses on this as an issue that remains 
even after dealing with discriminatory practices: the fact that a subpopulation has a disadvantage 
in  characteristics  should  still  be  of  concern  even  if  there  is  no  treatment  effect  due  to 
discrimination.  First note that including another explanatory variable (in particular, occupation) 
in the regression will always increase the return to characteristics.  These comparisons confirm 
our earlier observation that whites had a much greater advantage in characteristics over blacks (a 
factor of 2 to 3) than they did over mulattoes (always less than 2).  Likewise, the advantage of 
mulattoes in characteristics as compared to blacks (remarkably similar for males and females) is 
about a factor of 1.8.  The final comparison in each panel is Oaxaca’s (1973) adaptation of 
Becker’s (1971) discrimination coefficient, the relative benefit to the advantaged group from 
discrimination, assuming that the entire treatment residual can be attributed to discrimination (as 
measured by Cotton’s residual).  It is measured as the percentage gain in the wealth ratio as 
compared to what it would be without differential treatment.  Similar patterns are seen in these 
comparisons as those above.  The gains from treatment are large, and the differences within 
African-Americans are also large. 
So we see that, although differences in underlying characteristics were a driving force 
behind the mulatto-black wealth gap, treatment disadvantages were substantial. The magnitude 
of the treatment disadvantage estimates supports the colorism hypothesis, and reflecting on the 
characteristic effect further strengthens that hypothesis. Further research needs to uncover the 
extent to which pre-market discrimination led to differences in observable wealth-generating   -26- 
characteristics.  It is well known that light-complected slaves were more likely to receive skill 
training (Margo 1992), for example. It may have been that mixed-race free African Americans, 
too,  received  more  or  better  education  and  job  skills  than  monoracial  blacks.  Uncovering 
whether and why this conjecture was true represents a potentially fruitful line of further inquiry. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Does black always signify Black? In matters of race economists have assumed it does. Nearly 
every  economic  investigation  into  the  consequences  of  race  uncritically  and  without  pause 
separates Whites and Blacks into distinct and mutually exclusive categories. For the purposes of 
empirical work done during the past 50 years such a dichotomous racial classification scheme 
was probably appropriate, an intellectual and academic recognition of a broad social acceptance 
of Jim Crow’s “one-drop” rule. In the future, however, dichotomous racial categories may not 
capture  the  increasing  subtleties  of  race  as  race  mixing  spreads  and  becomes  increasingly 
socially acceptable. Empirical economics cannot continue to model race as a binary variable and 
expect the resulting coefficient to meaningfully capture the subtleties of race. 
  Our paper shows that mulattoes were treated differently than blacks in the mid-nineteenth 
century. As a percentage of white households’ log wealth, the predicted log wealth of black-
headed  households  was  20  percentage  points  lower  than  that  of  mulatto-headed  households. 
Regression decompositions reveal that treatment effects played a large role in explaining the 
white-mulatto wealth gap, even after including a measure of occupation; treatment effects played 
a comparable role for other subpopulation pairs as well. Our results are consistent with those 
from a sociological literature dating to Reuter (1917) and an emergent economics literature that 
finds  that  colorism  remains  a  powerful  social  phenomenon  in  minority  communities.  An   -27- 
important line of further inquiry will be to understand how color-based identities are established 
and reinforced in historical and modern populations. We intend to contribute to that developing 
literature as well. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Male-headed households    Female-headed households 
                       
  Full sample  White  Af-Am  Black  Mulatto    Full sample  White  AfAm  Black  Mulatto 
Af-Am  0.502            0.803         
Black  0.319            0.463         
Mulatto  0.183            0.340         
                       
Wealth  3,380  6,328  455  231  846    1,023  3,707  363  177  617 
  (18839)  (26285)  (2079)  (1009)  (3138)    (6130)  (13111)  (1556)  (842)  (2154) 
ln(Wealth)  5.074  5.924  4.230  3.876  4.846    4.176  5.424  3.869  3.450  4.439 
  (2.280)  (2.440)  (1.738)  (1.565)  (1.849)    (1.971)  (2.415)  (1.711)  (1.519)  (1.793) 
Age  40.354  40.089  40.617  40.951  40.034    42.923  45.008  42.411  43.174  41.371 
  (11.817)  (11.358)  (12.250)  (12.409)  (11.948)    (14.054)  (13.440)  (14.155)  (14.212)  (14.016) 
Immigrant  0.252  0.490  0.015  0.008  0.029    0.080  0.296  0.027  0.014  0.044 
Migrant  0.105  0.139  0.072  0.058  0.096    0.098  0.147  0.086  0.070  0.108 
SEI  22.320  29.756  14.940  13.446  17.545    14.892  18.487  14.008  12.895  15.524 
  (17.907)  (20.495)  (10.617)  (9.377)  (12.054)    (8.524)  (12.154)  (7.093)  (6.521)  (7.548) 
No occupation  0.058  0.050  0.065  0.057  0.079    0.456  0.684  0.400  0.332  0.492 
Literate head  0.821  0.971  0.672  0.606  0.788    0.736  0.944  0.684  0.626  0.764 
Literate males  1.209  1.506  0.914  0.796  1.119    0.485  0.787  0.411  0.361  0.478 
  (0.961)  (1.009)  (0.810)  (0.749)  (0.869)    (0.879)  (1.094)  (0.800)  (0.700)  (0.914) 
Literate females  1.109  1.383  0.837  0.723  1.034    1.280  1.776  1.158  1.039  1.320 
  (0.950)  (0.954)  (0.864)  (0.805)  (0.926)    (1.076)  (1.125)  (1.028)  (0.980)  (1.070) 
Adults in hhold  5.381  5.965  4.801  4.608  5.137    4.174  5.001  3.971  3.799  4.205 
  (2.662)  (2.706)  (2.485)  (2.398)  (2.597)    (2.436)  (2.539)  (2.366)  (2.265)  (2.479) 
Baltimore, Md  0.454  0.331  0.576  0.722  0.321    0.319  0.232  0.340  0.461  0.175 
Baton Rouge, La  0.009  0.012  0.007  0.001  0.017    0.012  0.021  0.009  0.004  0.017 
Charleston, SC  0.077  0.105  0.049  0.022  0.097    0.121  0.138  0.117  0.069  0.182 
Frederick, Md  0.030  0.032  0.028  0.025  0.033    0.027  0.050  0.021  0.019  0.024 
Louisville, Ky  0.046  0.055  0.037  0.037  0.038    0.039  0.049  0.037  0.042  0.030 
Mobile, Al  0.025  0.032  0.018  0.004  0.044    0.024  0.038  0.020  0.008  0.037 
Nashville, Ky  0.019  0.027  0.012  0.011  0.013    0.024  0.036  0.021  0.016  0.027 
New Orleans, La  0.203  0.238  0.169  0.063  0.355    0.223  0.238  0.220  0.119  0.357 
Petersburg, Va  0.085  0.101  0.069  0.089  0.034    0.132  0.121  0.135  0.186  0.064 
Richmond, Va  0.051  0.068  0.035  0.027  0.049    0.080  0.078  0.081  0.076  0.087 
                       
Observations  11,592  5,774  2,121  3,697  5,818    4,269  842  1,451  1,976  3,427 
 
Means, with standard deviations (except for dichotomous variables) in parentheses. 
As discussed in Section 3, we have imputed wealth values at the ward level. 
All same-gender subpopulation pairs of variables have means significantly different at p￿0.01 (p￿0.001 in almost all 
cases), except men’s age and the no-occupation indicator for white versus black men.  Due to undersampling of 
whites, the city indicators can only be compared for black and mulatto subsamples; those other than Fredericksburg, 
Louisville, and Richmond consistently differ across African-American classification with p￿0.001. 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census (1860), population census manuscripts. 
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 Table 2: Determinants of ln (household wealth) in the urban south: ordinary least squares regression 
 
Dependent variable  Male-headed households    Female-headed households 
     is ln(wealth)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                   
AfAm†  -1.731***  -1.553***  -1.257***  -0.759***    -1.481***  -1.335***  -1.187***  -1.092*** 
  (0.247)  (0.250)  (0.186)  (0.169)    (0.240)  (0.233)  (0.193)  (0.199) 
                   
Black  -2.052***  -1.842***  -1.456***  -0.949***    -1.908***  -1.738***  -1.452***  -1.344*** 
                  (0.271)  (0.278)  (0.220)  (0.202)    (0.247)  (0.239)  (0.199)  (0.213) 
Mulatto  -1.215***  -1.091***  -0.945***  -0.462***    -0.958***  -0.855***  -0.875***  -0.814*** 
                  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.152)  (0.131)    (0.219)  (0.218)  (0.198)  (0.200) 
Age  0.159***  0.133***  0.136***  0.124***    0.090**  0.081**  0.078**  0.077** 
                  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)    (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Age squared     -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***    -0.001**  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001* 
                  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Immigrant  -0.714***  -0.618**  -0.559***  -0.228^    -0.239  -0.18  -0.503*  -0.480^ 
                  (0.181)  (0.184)  (0.138)  (0.119)    (0.318)  (0.321)  (0.245)  (0.250) 
Migrant  0.313  0.374^  0.172  0.091    0.282  0.346  -0.059  -0.088 
                  (0.199)  (0.193)  (0.142)  (0.123)    (0.236)  (0.232)  (0.249)  (0.262) 
Literate  0.991***  0.838**  0.830***  0.501*    0.584***  0.344^  0.322  0.278 
                  (0.240)  (0.253)  (0.223)  (0.215)    (0.149)  (0.201)  (0.224)  (0.232) 
Adults in hhold    0.105***  0.135***  0.123***      0.104*  0.088*  0.086* 
                    (0.028)  (0.024)  (0.023)      (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Literate males    -0.011  -0.047  -0.059      -0.09  -0.094  -0.105 
                    (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.039)      (0.094)  (0.078)  (0.077) 
Literate females    0.162*  0.197***  0.115*      0.205*  0.251*  0.254** 
                    (0.066)  (0.052)  (0.053)      (0.102)  (0.099)  (0.091) 
SEI        0.038***          0.007 
        (0.002)          (0.012) 
No Occupation        0.15          0.306 
        (0.182)          (0.185) 
City  controls  No  No  Yes  Yes    No  No  Yes  Yes 
                   
Constant          0.980^  0.958^  0.184  -0.2    2.627***  2.290**  1.863*  1.653* 
                  (0.564)  (0.526)  (0.432)  (0.405)    (0.734)  (0.765)  (0.733)  (0.812) 
                   
Adj. R-squared         0.163  0.185  0.226  0.310    0.156  0.180  0.228  0.231 
N                 11592  11592  11592  11592    4269  4269  4269  4269 
prob F>0 for Mulatto==Black  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
†The first row (italicized) reports only the African-American indicator variable estimated in equations that also 
included the variables in the associated columns but did not include the Black and Mulatto variables. 
Other  notes:  Robust  standard  errors  (allowing  for  correlation  within  wards,  Stata®’s  cluster  option)  are  in 
parentheses.  Probability weighting was used to adjust for undersampling of white-headed households.  Significance 
is indicated by ^ p￿0.1, * p￿0.05, ** p￿0.01, *** p￿0.001. 
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Table 3: Complexion-based wealth decompositions’ treatment (T) and characteristics (C) effects 
 
  Male-headed     Advantaged group (H):   Mulatto    White    White    White 
  Disadvantaged (L):   Black    Mulatto     Black    African-American 
                            
  mean log wealth: ln(wH), ln(wL)   4.846, 3.876    5.888, 4.846  ￿ 5.888, 3.876  ￿ 5.888, 4.230 
  geometric mean wealth ($): wH, wL   127.2, 48.2    360.7, 127.2  ￿ 360.7, 48.2  ￿ 360.7, 68.7 
  raw differential: R = ln(wH) - ln(wL)   0.970    1.042  ￿ 2.012  ￿ 1.658 
  raw ratio (%): wL/wH = e
-R   38%    35%  ￿ 13%  ￿ 19% 
                          
  Model From Table 2:   (3)  (4)    (3)  (4)    (3)  (4)    (3)  (4) 
   treatment: T = R – C, (as % of R)    treatment: T = R – C, (as % of R) 
Advantaged group, C = bH(xH - xL)   0.444  0.402    0.888  0.431  ￿ 1.354  0.900  ￿ 1.184  0.729 
    (46%)  (41%)    (85%)  (41%)  ￿ (67%)  (45%)  ￿ (71%)  (44%) 
Disadvantaged group, C = bL(xH - xL)    0.391  0.344    0.686  0.404  ￿ 0.664  0.308  ￿ 0.701  0.378 
    (40%)  (35%)    (66%)  (39%)  ￿ (33%)  (15%)  ￿ (42%)  (23%) 
Population-weighted, C = b*(xH - xL)   0.411  0.365    0.882￿ 0.431￿ ￿ 1.321￿ 0.873￿ ￿ 1.149￿ 0.704￿
   (42%)  (38%)    (85%)￿ (41%)￿￿ (66%)￿ (43%)￿￿ (69%)￿ (42%)￿
































































WH/WL, estimated wealth due to 
characteristics ratio = e
C = e
R-T   1.75  1.83    1.17  1.84  ￿ 2.00  3.13  ￿ 1.66  2.60 
  D = e
T - 1 — see notes   51%  44%    142%  54%  ￿ 275%  139%  ￿ 215%  102% 
                           
  Female-headed           Advantaged (H):   Mulatto    White    White    White 
  Disadvantaged (L):   Black    Mulatto     Black    African-American 
                            
  mean log wealth: ln(wH), ln(wL)   4.439, 3.450    5.538, 4.439    5.538, 3.450    5.538, 3.869 
  geometric mean wealth ($): wH, wL   84.7, 31.5    254.2, 84.7    254.2, 31.5    254.2, 47.9 
  raw differential: R = ln(wH) - ln(wL)   0.989    1.099    2.088    1.669 
  raw ratio (%): wL/wH = e
-R   37%    33%    12%    19% 
                          
  Model from Table 2:   (3)  (4)    (3)  (4)    (3)  (4)    (3)  (4) 
   treatment: T = R – C, (as % of R)    treatment: T = R – C, (as % of R) 
Advantaged group, C = bH(xH - xL)   0.422  0.380    0.761  0.716    1.325  1.245    1.086  1.021 
    (43%)  (38%)    (69%)  (65%)    (63%)  (60%)    (65%)  (61%) 
Disadvantaged group, C = bL(xH - xL)    0.421  0.387    0.587  0.475    1.122  1.043    0.833  0.729 
    (43%)  (39%)    (53%)  (43%)    (54%)  (50%)    (50%)  (44%) 
Population-weighted, C = b*(xH - xL)   0.421  0.384    0.739  0.686    1.291  1.212    1.022  0.947 
   (43%)  (39%)    (67%)  (62%)    (62%)  (58%)    (61%)  (57%) 
































































WH/WL, estimated wealth due to 
characteristics ratio = e
C = e
R-T   1.76  1.83    1.43  1.51    2.22  2.40    1.91  2.06 
  D = e
T - 1 — see notes   52%  47%    109%  99%    264%  236%    178%  158% 
 
Notes: Calculated from regressions specified as those reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, but run separately for 
each color and gender subpopulation.  Oaxaca’s (1973) adaptation of Becker’s (1971) discrimination coefficient, D 
= ((wH/wL)-(wH/wL)) / (wH/wL) = e
T – 1, is the increase in wealth due to unmeasured differences, using the boldface 
(population-weighted) counterfactual estimate of the treatment residual, C = b*(xH – xL). 